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INTRODUCTION
The dormant Commerce Clause and state bar admission rules are
in conflict. On the one hand, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits
states from engaging in economic protectionism. 1 On the other hand,
states design bar admission rules in large part to promote the economic
interests of in-state lawyers. 2 Courts have nonetheless deferred to state
licensing restrictions on the practice of law. 3 One common licensing
restriction is the bar examination—a form of economic protectionism. 4
Most states require prospective lawyers to take and pass their bar
examination. 5 Wisconsin, however, allows certain law school
*

J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., 2007, Iowa State University.
1
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
2
Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of
Admission Rules For Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 146–50
(2004).
3
See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam).
4
Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer’s Next Hurdle: The State-Based
Bar Examination System, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 235, 249 (2000).
5
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2009,
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graduates admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the diploma
privilege. 6
Put simply, the Wisconsin diploma privilege grants graduates of
both the University of Wisconsin Law School and Marquette
University Law School admission to the Wisconsin bar without
examination. 7 Not only do recipients of the diploma privilege avoid
the bar examination, but they also incur fewer expenses compared to
bar exam applicants who prudently enroll in a bar review course.
Unlike graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools, graduates of other
ABA-accredited law schools who desire to practice in Wisconsin must
take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination. 8 In Wiesmueller v.
Kosobucki, a law student at a non-Wisconsin law school challenged
the Wisconsin diploma privilege under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 9 Because the activities of lawyers play an
important part in commercial intercourse, 10 the diploma privilege must
comply with the constraints of the Commerce Clause. 11
This comment considers whether the Wisconsin diploma privilege
impermissibly constrains the mobility of lawyers in violation of the
Commerce Clause. 12 Part I sketches the contextual background of both
the diploma privilege and the dormant Commerce Clause. Part II
reviews the facts, procedural history, and reasoning of the Seventh
http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/Comp_Guide/CompGuide_2
009.pdf.
6
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
7
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
8
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04.
9
571 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2009).
10
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (quoting Goldfarb
v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975)).
11
See Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 923
(7th Cir. 1994).
12
Recent law graduates can gain admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of
the diploma privilege or through the Wisconsin bar examination. WIS. SUP. CT. R.
40.03–04. Also, licensed attorneys who satisfy the proof of practice elsewhere
requirement can gain admission to the Wisconsin bar without examination. WIS.
SUP. CT. R. 40.05. This comment focuses on the admission procedures available to
recent law graduates.
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Circuit’s opinion in Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki. Part III discusses the
effects of the diploma privilege on Wisconsin and argues that the state
does not arbitrarily discriminate between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries of the diploma privilege. Finally, Part III subjects the
diploma privilege to the Pike balancing test and argues that adversely
affected in-state interests guarantee that the diploma privilege is no
more burdensome than is necessary to achieve its intended purpose.
I. GENERAL CONTEXT: THE DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Diploma Privilege
In 1842, Virginia enacted the first diploma privilege statute that
allowed graduates of two Virginia law schools—William and Mary
College and the University of Virginia—admission to the Virginia bar
without examination. 13 Initially, many law schools favored the
diploma privilege as a means to entice prospective students to obtain a
formal legal education. 14 Since 1842, thirty-two states and the District
of Columbia have granted one of three variations of the diploma
privilege: a universal diploma privilege, in which the state admits
graduates from any United States law school; a state university
diploma privilege, in which the state admits only graduates of the
state’s law school; or a statewide diploma privilege, in which the state
admits graduates of any law school within the state. 15
In 1870, shortly after the University of Wisconsin established a
law school, the Wisconsin state legislature enacted a provision
conferring the diploma privilege on graduates of the state university. 16
Two different theories have been advanced for this enactment. One
13

Thomas W. Goldman, Use of the Diploma Privilege in the United States, 10
TULSA L.J. 36, 39 (1974) [hereinafter Thomas Goldman].
14
Id.
15
Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 645, 646 (2000).
16
Richard A. Stack, Jr., Commentary, Admission upon Diploma to the
Wisconsin Bar, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 109, 118 (1975).
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theory proposes that Wisconsin sought to attract students to the
University of Wisconsin who were flocking to Michigan. 17 Another
plausible explanation rests on Wisconsin’s preference for formal
training over the minimal amount required to satisfy the in-court oral
examination then in existence. 18
In 1897, the Wisconsin state legislature abandoned the state
university diploma privilege and enacted a universal diploma
privilege. 19 This provision was short-lived and, in 1903, the Wisconsin
state legislature returned to a state university privilege. 20 Following
the repeal of a nationwide privilege, law school graduates could gain
admission to the Wisconsin bar in one of three ways: (1) by virtue of a
diploma from the law school at the University of Wisconsin; (2)
through the state bar examination; or (3) by proof of practice
elsewhere for five of the prior eight years in another jurisdiction. 21 In
1933, despite opposition from the faculty at Marquette University Law
School, 22 the Wisconsin state legislature extended the diploma
privilege to Marquette graduates. 23
As bar associations mobilized in the early and mid-1900s, state
interest in the diploma privilege steadily declined.24 In 1921, the
American Bar Association formally denounced the diploma privilege,
stating: “[t]he American Bar Association is of the opinion that
graduation from a law school should not confer the right of admission
to the bar, and that every candidate should be subjected to an
17

John McDill Fox, Preface to Carl Zollman, Diploma Privilege in Wisconsin,
11 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 73 (1927).
18
See Moran, supra note 15, at 646; Stack, supra note 16, at 118 n.28.
19
Stack, supra note 16, at 119.
20
Id.
21
In re Admission of Certain Persons to the Bar, 247 N.W. 877, 877 (Wis.
1933) (per curiam).
22
Carl Zollman, Diploma Privilege in Wisconsin, 11 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 78
(1927).
23
Stack, supra note 16, at 118 n.28.
24
In 1917, twenty-two schools honored the diploma privilege. Thomas
Goldman, supra note 13, at 41. By 1948, only thirteen schools honored the diploma
privilege. Id. at 42.
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examination by public authority to determine his fitness.” 25
Presumably, many states ceased honoring the diploma privilege out of
a fear of losing ABA-accreditation. 26 Despite opposition from the
American Bar Association, the Wisconsin Supreme Court maintained
confidence in the state’s two law schools and retained the diploma
privilege. 27 In 1954, the Legal Education and Bar Admissions
Committee of the Wisconsin Bar Association conducted a thorough
study to determine whether the Wisconsin diploma privilege was
detrimental to the training and education of lawyers at the two
Wisconsin law schools. 28 The committee voted in favor of retaining
the diploma privilege. 29 Most notably, the committee determined that
law school faculty were in a better position to test and evaluate an
applicant’s qualifications for the practice of law than an examining
board; that a change in the diploma privilege would lower present
teaching standards by requiring an undue emphasis on bar examination
preparation; and that education in Wisconsin ranked high nationally,
both in terms of legal education and professional competency. 30
Like other states, regulating admission to the practice of law in
Wisconsin vests exclusively in the state supreme court. 31 Wisconsin’s
diploma privilege remained virtually unchanged until the Wisconsin
Supreme Court proposed stricter graduation requirements for the two
Wisconsin law schools in 1971. 32 Before the proposal, graduates of the
two Wisconsin law schools gained admission to the Wisconsin bar
25

Id. at 41. The American Bar Association and the National Conference of Bar
Examiners reaffirmed this position in 1971. Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need
the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar
Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1201
(1995).
26
See In re Yanni, 697 N.W.2d 394, 400 n.7 (S.D. 2005).
27
Stack, supra note 16, at 123.
28
Id. at 123–24.
29
Id. at 124.
30
Id. at 124–125.
31
State ex rel. State Bar of Wis. v. Keller, 114 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Wis. 1962),
vacated, 374 U.S. 102 (1963); see also WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
32
Moran, supra note 15, at 649.
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simply by earning a diploma. 33 In 1971, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
repealed and recreated the diploma privilege rule. 34 After additions to
the rule by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1973, 35 applicants seeking
admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the diploma privilege were
now required to complete the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules, 36 for
a minimum of eighty-four credits. 37
The thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules ensure that students
seeking admission to the practice of law in Wisconsin by virtue of the
diploma privilege take certain courses that prepare them to be
competent attorneys. 38 Under the sixty-credit rule, applicants must
complete a minimum of sixty semester credits in an enumerated list of
about thirty subjects. 39 Further, applicants must satisfy the thirty-credit
rule, which requires completion of at least thirty of the sixty semester
credits in ten subject matter areas. 40 Diploma privilege applicants must
complete the mandatory and elective credits in “law school courses
having as their primary and direct purpose the study of rules and
principles of substantive and procedural law as they may arise in the
33

See WIS. STAT. § 256.28 (1969) (repealed 1971).
See WIS. STAT. § 256.28 (1971).
35
Peter K. Rofes, Mandatory Obsolescence: The Thirty Credit Rule and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 787, 806 n.57 (1999).
36
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
37
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(1).
38
Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar
Exam: A Look at Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 69, 95
(2007).
39
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2)(a). The subjects are administrative law, appellate
practice and procedure, commercial transactions, conflict of laws, constitutional law,
contracts, corporations, creditors’ rights, criminal law and procedure, damages,
domestic relations, equity, evidence, future interests, insurance, jurisdiction of
courts, legislation, labor law, ethics and legal responsibilities of the profession,
partnership, personal property, pleading and practice, public utilities, quasi-contracts,
real property, taxation, torts, trade regulation, trusts, and wills and estates. Id.
40
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2)(b). The subjects are constitutional law, contracts,
criminal law and procedure, evidence, jurisdiction of courts, ethics and legal
responsibilities of the legal profession, pleading and practice, real property, torts, and
wills and estates. Id.
34
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courts and administrative agencies of the United States and this
state.” 41
The thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules represented a major shift in
the diploma privilege. In 1971, three other states—Mississippi,
Montana, and West Virginia—honored the diploma privilege. 42
Admission to the practice of law in these states by virtue of the
diploma privilege merely required the production of a diploma. 43 By
contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed mandatory and
elective curriculum requirements on diploma privilege applicants. 44
Quite simply, “Wisconsin has the most restrictive diploma privilege
[rule] ever written.” 45
Today, Wisconsin remains the only state to honor the diploma
privilege. 46 Wisconsin also grants licensure to applicants who
demonstrate legal competency through the bar examination or proof of
practice elsewhere. 47 The proof of practice elsewhere rule requires
applicants to have practiced law for three of the prior five years in
another jurisdiction which has reciprocity with Wisconsin. 48
Applicants seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar through the state
bar examination or proof of practice elsewhere are not subject to the
thirty-credit and sixty credit rules. 49

41

WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2).
Thomas Goldman, supra note 13, at 42.
43
Id.
44
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
45
Thomas Goldman, supra note 13, at 42.
46
Trujillo, supra note 38, at 94. In 2006, Franklin Pierce Law Center in New
Hampshire implemented an alternative licensure program similar to the Wisconsin
diploma privilege. Id. Students who complete this program may gain admission to
the practice of law in New Hampshire without taking the full bar examination. Id.
47
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04–05.
48
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.05.
49
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04–05.
42
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.” 50 By its terms, the Commerce Clause is a grant of authority to
Congress, not an explicit limitation on the power of the States. 51
However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
Commerce Clause also contains an implied limitation on the power of
the States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate
commerce. 52 This negative implication is known as the dormant
Commerce Clause. 53 Despite the lack of explicit textual justification
for the dormant Commerce Clause in the Constitution, the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court on this point reflect “a course of
adjudication unbroken though the Nation’s history.” 54
The fundamental objective of the dormant Commerce Clause is to
preserve a national market for competition undisturbed by state
regulatory measures that benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors. 55 In short, the dormant Commerce
Clause prohibits economic protectionism. 56 Justice Jackson’s famous
words illustrate the central importance of federal control over
interstate and foreign commerce:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his
50

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007).
52
See, e.g., Welton v. State of Mo., 91 U.S. 275, 280–82 (1875); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 318–19 (1851).
53
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc., 550 U.S. at 338.
54
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
55
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).
56
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
51
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exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or
regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in the
Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the
vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality. 57
Still, the dormant Commerce Clause does not invalidate all state
restrictions on commerce relating to the health, life, and safety of their
citizens, even though the legislation might incidentally affect national
commerce. 58
Consistent with these principles, the United States Supreme Court
has adopted a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic
regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause. 59 When a state
statute directly regulates or discriminates 60 against interstate
commerce, or when the statute’s effect favors in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests, the Court generally strikes down
the statute under a virtual per se rule of invalidity. 61 The burden to
show discrimination 62 rests on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. 63 Once this burden is met, the state must demonstrate that a
57

H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 537, 539 (1949).
Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 306.
59
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
578–79 (1986).
60
The term “discrimination” means “differential treatment of in-state and outof-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Or.Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
61
See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). But see Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (upholding Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish
because the regulation, despite discriminating on its face against interstate trade,
served legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available
nondiscriminatory alternatives).
62
A state statute can constitute economic protectionism on proof of either
discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981).
63
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
58
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legitimate local purpose cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory means. 64 In effect, the Court applies strict
scrutiny. 65
In contrast, the Court applies less scrutiny when a state advances
legitimate objectives for a nondiscriminatory regulation. 66 The Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. articulated the general contours of the
nondiscrimination standard:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities. 67
For purposes of constitutional inquiry, courts treat judiciary-approved
bar admission rules as legislation. 68 The bifurcated approach to
analyzing bar admission rules under the dormant Commerce Clause
poses significant challenges to the judiciary because no clear line
64

Id.
See Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 101 (describing the first tier standard as
the “strictest scrutiny”); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,
392 (1994) (describing the first tier standard as “rigorous scrutiny”); Taylor, 477
U.S. at 144 (describing the first tier standard as “the strictest scrutiny”).
66
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
583 n.16 (1997) (referring to the Pike test as a more deferential standard); City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (referring to the Pike test as a much more flexible
approach); Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of
Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 571, 574 (1997) (describing the Pike test as a relaxed standard).
67
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).
68
Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 923 (7th
Cir. 1994).
65

47
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separates the category subject to the virtual per se invalid test and the
category subject to the Pike balancing test. 69 Applying the appropriate
test ultimately requires consideration of the overall effect of the rule
on both local and interstate activity. 70
II. WIESMUELLER V. KOSOBUCKI
Christopher Wiesmueller attended Oklahoma City University
School of Law, an ABA-accredited law school in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. 71 Unlike graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools,
graduates of Oklahoma City University School of Law who desire to
practice in Wisconsin must take and pass the Wisconsin bar
examination. 72 Prior to graduation, Wiesmueller commenced a civil
action against the Director of the Wisconsin Board of Bar Examiners,
John Kosobucki. 73 He alleged that the Wisconsin diploma privilege,
available to graduates of Wisconsin’s ABA-accredited law schools but
not to graduates of other ABA-accredited law schools, deprived him of
his rights secured under the Commerce Clause.74
A. The First District Court Opinion
In the district court, Wiesmueller filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, claiming
that the diploma privilege discriminated against interstate commerce.75
Judge Shabaz of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin first analyzed whether Wisconsin’s diploma
69

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
70
Id.
71
Wiesmueller v. Kosubucki [sic], 492 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1037 (W.D. Wis.
2007).
72
Id. at 1038.
73
Id. Wiesmueller also named as defendants members of both the Wisconsin
Board of Bar Examiners and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. at 1037–38.
74
Id. at 1037.
75
Id.

48
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privilege discriminated against interstate commerce or regulated
evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce. 76
He reasoned that the rule treated residents and non-residents alike and
did not discriminate against interstate commerce. 77
Having found an even-handed regulation, Judge Shabaz then
considered whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce was
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 78 He
reasoned that requiring graduates of law schools not in Wisconsin to
show their familiarity with Wisconsin law was reasonable in light of
Wisconsin’s interest in regulating the legal profession. 79 Further,
without any discussion, Judge Shabaz concluded that, based on the
reasoning in Sestric v. Clark 80 and Scariano v. Justices of Supreme
Court of State of Indiana, 81 requiring graduates of all law schools to
take the state bar examination except graduates of the two Wisconsin
law schools did not violate the Commerce Clause. 82 The district court
denied Wiesmueller’s motion for summary judgment. 83
About one week later, Judge Shabaz entertained the defendants’
motion to dismiss Wiesmueller’s complaint on the pleadings. 84 Having
found that the Wisconsin bar admission rules did not violate the
Commerce Clause, Judge Shabaz determined that the defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and granted their motion to
dismiss. 85 Additionally, Judge Shabaz denied as moot Wiesmueller’s

76

Id. at 1038.
Id.
78
Id. at 1039 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
79
Id.
80
765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985).
81
38 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 1994).
82
Wiesmueller, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
83
Id.
84
Weismueller [sic] v. Kosubucki [sic], No. 07-C-211-S, 2007 WL 4882649,
at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 28, 2007).
85
Id.
77
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pending motion to certify a class action. 86 Wiesmueller appealed the
district court’s judgment. 87
B. The First Seventh Circuit Opinion
Shortly after filing his notice of appeal, Wiesmueller passed the
Wisconsin bar examination; consequently, the Seventh Circuit
dismissed his claims as moot because the object of his suit—licensure
in Wisconsin—was now attained. 88 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit
held that Wiesmueller could appeal the district court’s denial of class
certification, which was not moot because “if a class is certified, its
members (unless they opt out of the class), and not just the named
plaintiff, are bound by the judgment.” 89
The Seventh Circuit determined that the district court failed to
consider whether the proposed class met the criteria set forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 90 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the district court never ruled on the merits of the motion for
class certification because it erroneously assumed that ruling on the
merits of the suit rendered the motion moot. 91 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial of class certification and remanded
the case for further proceedings. 92
C. The Second District Court Opinion
Following the first decision in the Seventh Circuit, Corrine
Wiesmueller and Heather Devan, two Wisconsin residents who
recently graduated from Oklahoma City University School of Law,
86

Id.
Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 2008).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 786.
90
Id. at 787. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class action law suits.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
91
Wiesmueller, 513 F.3d at 787.
92
Id.
87
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intervened as plaintiffs. 93 Christopher Wiesmueller withdrew as a
plaintiff and appeared as attorney for the newly substituted plaintiffs. 94
On remand, Judge Crabb of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin confined the court’s review to whether a
class should be certified for purposes of pursuing an appeal of the
prior district court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. 95 She
determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; thus, Judge
Crabb certified the plaintiffs’ proposed class.96 Judge Crabb also
dismissed the plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause challenge on the basis of
the first district court’s opinion. 97 The plaintiffs appealed. 98
D. The Second Seventh Circuit Opinion
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner first considered whether the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 99 The defendants argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because any judicial relief would not
make them better off. 100 According to the defendants, the plaintiffs
would still be subject to the Wisconsin bar examination because they
had not completed sufficient credit hours in the specified types of
courses in law school classes that included Wisconsin law. 101 The
93

Wiesmueller v. Kosubucki [sic], 251 F.R.D. 365, 367 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 367–68. The certified class consisted of all persons who (1) graduated
or will graduate with a professional degree in law from any law school outside
Wisconsin accredited by the American Bar Association, (2) apply to the Wisconsin
Board of Bar Examiners for a character and fitness evaluation to practice law in
Wisconsin before their law school graduation or within thirty days of their
graduation, and (3) have not yet been admitted to the Wisconsin bar. Id. at 368.
97
Id. at 367.
98
Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2009).
99
Id.
100
See id.
101
Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 21–22, Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2527).
94
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Seventh Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument, noting that unequal
treatment can be eliminated without conferring any benefit on those
challenging the rule. 102 The Seventh Circuit further determined that, if
the court invalidated the diploma privilege, Wisconsin might instead
require all applicants to take a continuing legal education course in
lieu of a bar examination, which would give the plaintiffs most of the
relief they seek. 103
Finding the redressability requirement met, the Seventh Circuit
next addressed the merits. 104 According to Judge Posner, “[g]raduates
of accredited law schools in states other than Wisconsin who would
like to practice law in that state are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis
graduates of Wisconsin’s two law schools.” 105 Unlike graduates of
Wisconsin’s two law schools, graduates of other ABA-accredited law
schools seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar must either have
practiced law for five years in another state or have passed the
Wisconsin bar examination. 106 For applicants seeking admission
through the bar examination, the amount of preparation time and costs
were significant. 107 Judge Posner concluded that the diploma privilege
rule implicated the dormant Commerce Clause since it influenced an
aspiring lawyer’s decision where to attend law school. 108
The Seventh Circuit discussed the Supreme Court’s two-tiered
approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the dormant
Commerce Clause and suggested that the diploma privilege rule
implicated the Pike balancing test. 109 According to Judge Posner, the
diploma privilege favored the economic interests of the Wisconsin law
schools; nonetheless, the diploma privilege only indirectly affected
interstate commerce and regulated evenhandedly because both the
102

Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 702.
Id. at 702–03.
104
Id. at 703.
105
Id. at 701.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 705.
109
Id. at 703.
103
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diploma privilege and admission to Wisconsin law schools were not
limited to state residents. 110
But, the court found itself in an “evidentiary vacuum created by
the early termination of the case by the grant of a motion to
dismiss.” 111 If Wisconsin law was no greater part of the curriculum of
the two Wisconsin law schools than other ABA-accredited law
schools, then the diploma privilege “create[d] an arbitrary distinction
between graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of
other accredited law schools.” 112 This distinction, according to Judge
Posner, burdened interstate commerce. 113 Because the plaintiffs had no
opportunity to justify this distinction, the Seventh Circuit remanded
the case to allow the plaintiffs to build an evidentiary record. 114
Despite the court’s reluctance to issue a ruling, Judge Posner
suggested that Wisconsin law did not occupy a larger place in the
curriculum at the two Wisconsin law schools than at other ABAaccredited law schools. 115 He noted that Wisconsin law schools used
the same casebooks and other teaching materials as other ABAaccredited law schools. 116 Moreover, because no graduates of the
Wisconsin law schools took the state bar examination, Judge Posner
concluded that the faculty had less incentive to test them on Wisconsin
law. 117 Citing portions of the diploma privilege rule, the defendants
argued that the rule expressly mandated that the curriculum of the
Wisconsin law schools include Wisconsin law. 118 The Seventh Circuit
rejected this assertion, finding no provisions in the rule to support a
curriculum saturated in Wisconsin law. 119 Judge Posner reasoned that
110

Id. at 703–04.
Id. at 704.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 707.
115
Id. at 704.
116
Id. at 705.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
111
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this interpretation of the rule was consistent with Wisconsin’s proof of
practice elsewhere procedure, which did not require any knowledge of
Wisconsin law, and the Wisconsin bar examination, which included
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and the
Multistate Essay Examination. 120
Judge Posner also rejected the defendants’ argument that the
diploma privilege rule gave the Wisconsin Supreme Court a
supervisory role so that it could assure a curriculum oriented toward
Wisconsin law. 121 Judge Posner found no evidence in the record or the
diploma privilege rule to support this role. 122 He also refuted the
argument that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, by virtue of creating the
diploma privilege, entrusted only the two local law schools to prepare
its students for the practice of law in Wisconsin. 123
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the
market participant doctrine exempted the Wisconsin bar admission
rules from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 124 The market participant
doctrine allows states to engage in otherwise discriminatory practices
so long as the state acts as a market participant rather than a market
regulator. 125 A state acting as a market participant is not subject to the
restraints of the Commerce Clause. 126 The Seventh Circuit rejected the
defendants’ argument because the diploma privilege applied equally to
Marquette University Law School, a private institution. 127 In short,
even in the face of Judge Posner’s skepticism, the Seventh Circuit
remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to show that

120

Id. at 706.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
126
White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208
(1983).
127
Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 707.
121
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Wisconsin law made up a greater part of the curriculum at the two
Wisconsin law schools than at other ABA-accredited law schools. 128
III. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki is
important in many respects. Most significantly, Judge Posner
suggested that the diploma privilege burdened interstate commerce in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 129 Subjecting the diploma
privilege to the appropriate level of review under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine reveals that it survives constitutional
scrutiny. Part A of this section justifies the diploma privilege. Part B of
this section subjects the diploma privilege to the Supreme Court’s twotiered test and argues that adversely affected in-state interests result in
a permissible burden under the Pike balancing test.
A. The Diploma Privilege and Its Putative Local Benefits
The American legal profession considers competency as one of its
core values. 130 Each state has a compelling interest in guaranteeing
that lawyers practicing within their borders possess a minimum level
of competence. 131 States can ensure a minimum level of competence
by subjecting prospective lawyers to high standards so long as the
standards comply with certain constitutional mandates. 132 By
guaranteeing a minimum level of competence, states can protect its
citizens from subpar legal representation, as many citizens may be
unable to adequately assess the competence of lawyers on their

128

Id.
Id. at 704.
130
Sara J. Lewis, Note, Charting the “Middle” Way: Liberalizing
Multijurisdictional Practice Rules for Lawyers Representing Sophisticated Clients,
22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 646 (2009).
131
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
132
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
129
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own. 133 The power to prescribe qualifications for admission to the
practice of law has traditionally been left exclusively to the states. 134
In Wisconsin, the power to regulate the practice of law vests
exclusively in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 135 The diploma privilege
is an exercise of this judicial ruling-making authority. 136
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not expressly address the
benefits of the diploma privilege when proposing and implementing it.
One commentator argues that the absence of an express purpose
behind the diploma privilege’s creation contributes to the rule’s
shortcomings. 137 Others, however, believe the diploma privilege
furthers Wisconsin’s interest in licensing lawyers—that is,
guaranteeing that only competent lawyers practice within its border. 138
Defendants in Wiesmueller argued that the diploma privilege was
designed to ensure competency in the practice of law, including
familiarity in Wisconsin’s rules and statutes. 139 This view is consistent
with the undisputed fact that only Wisconsin law schools
systematically instruct in Wisconsin law.
Even though the University of Wisconsin and Marquette
University are law schools of national stature,140 the curriculum at
both schools includes Wisconsin law, not simply the rules and
principles of substantive and procedural law common across American
states. 141 Indeed, the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules mandate a
133

Lewis, supra note 130, at 647; see also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 731
(1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (lawyers enjoy a “broad monopoly . . . to do things
other citizens may not lawfully do”).
134
See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam).
135
In re Bar Admission of Anderson, 715 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Wis. 2006) (per
curiam); see also WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3–4.
136
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
137
Rofes, supra note 35, at 807–12.
138
See Trujillo, supra note 38, at 95–97; Moran, supra note 15, at 649–51;
Stack, supra note 16, at 21.
139
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 101, at 36.
140
See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).
141
Gene R. Rankin, No. Other States Should Catch up to Wisconsin,
WISCONSIN LAWYER, Dec. 2002, available at
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curriculum oriented in both national and Wisconsin law. 142 In addition
to doctrinal courses, students at the two Wisconsin law schools take
clinical and other skills training courses that incorporate Wisconsin
law. 143 The diploma privilege also encourages knowledge in a wide
range of legal subjects under the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules
rather than the limited number of courses traditionally tested on the
bar examination. 144 Significantly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deems
these subject matter areas fundamental to practicing law.145
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=48646#con (arguing that certain areas of
the law are unique to Wisconsin, which both in-state law schools emphasis); Eric
Goldman, Wisconsin Diploma Privilege Ruling Comments–Wiesmueller v.
Kosobucki, GOLDMAN’S OBSERVATIONS, July 29, 2009,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/personal/archives/2009/07/wisconsin_diplo.html
[hereinafter Eric Goldman] (noting that Wisconsin’s law schools emphasize both
national and Wisconsin law).
142
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03(2) (“All semester credits so certified shall have been
earned in regular law school courses having as their primary and direct purpose the
study of rules and principles of substantive and procedural law as they may arise in
the courts and administrative agencies of the United States and this state.” (emphasis
added)).
143
See MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, COURSE DESCRIPTIONS 2007–
2008, http://law.marquette.edu/s3/site/images/current/courseDescriptions06.pdf;
University of Wisconsin Law School, Clinical Education & Skills Training,
http://www.law.wisc.edu/academics/clinics/clinicaleducationskillstraining.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2009).
144
Moran, supra note 15, at 652.
145
One member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted:
The diploma privilege makes good sense for Wisconsin. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court (in charge of attorney admissions) is very familiar with
the two excellent A.B.A. accredited schools in Wisconsin. . . . Both
schools have high standards for admission and graduation. To qualify for
the diploma privilege, students must take certain courses (determined by
our court as being fundamental) and achieve a certain average score for
those courses. In short, we have confidence in the quality of graduates
from these two schools. . . . Wisconsin should not be viewed as the last
to retain the diploma privilege; I like to think of Wisconsin as the leader
on this issue, not the holdout.
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Judge Posner’s narrow view of the curriculum at the two
Wisconsin law schools derived in part from the admission without
examination procedure. According to Judge Posner, the faculty has
less incentive to teach Wisconsin law since no graduates of these law
schools take the bar examination. 146 However, legal educators prepare
students to not only pass a bar examination but also practice law. 147
Because graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools often practice in
Wisconsin, the faculty has an incentive to prepare students for actual
practice in the state and teach them Wisconsin law. 148 Also, a number
of faculty members at the University of Wisconsin Law School and
Marquette University Law School formerly practiced or currently
practice in Wisconsin, and these faculty members likely emphasis
local statutes and rules applicable to the subject matter covered. 149
Beyond producing competent graduates knowledgeable in both
national and local law, the diploma privilege also indirectly benefits
Wisconsin. For example, the diploma privilege increases contact
between the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the two Wisconsin law
schools, thereby promoting relationships between the judiciary and
law school graduates. 150 These relationships allow the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to determine whether the breadth of legal education at
the two Wisconsin law schools measures up to the court’s expectations
and whether graduates in fact possess the requisite competency and

Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, HOW APPEALING, Sept. 13, 2004,
http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2004_09_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html.
146
Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).
147
Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to
Pass Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 271 (2007).
148
See Moran, supra note 15, at 651; Eric Goldman, supra note 141.
149
See Marquette University Law School, Faculty & Staff,
http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?10927 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009);
University of Wisconsin Law School, Faculty & Staff,
http://www.law.wisc.edu/faculty/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); see also Shenfield v.
Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 687 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (three-judge panel).
150
Moran, supra note 15, at 654.
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moral character to practice law. 151 Moreover, the diploma privilege
benefits consumers by increasing the number of practicing attorneys in
Wisconsin. 152 Increasing the number of lawyers in Wisconsin lowers
prices for legal services and provides consumers the freedom to
choose their own lawyer. 153
B. The Diploma Privilege and a Deferential Standard of Review
In addition to determining the putative local benefits of a
challenged rule, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine instructs a
reviewing court to apply the appropriate standard of review. 154 A
heightened level of review applies when a rule directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce. 155 This level of review is
known as the virtual per se rule of invalidity test. 156 In contrast, when
a rule regulates even-handedly, a relaxed standard, commonly referred
to as the Pike balancing test, applies. 157 Applying the appropriate level
of review is critical since these two tests produce disparate results.158
The Pike balancing test is the appropriate level of review when
assessing the constitutionality of the diploma privilege under the
dormant Commerce Clause.

151

See id.; Bashman, supra note 145.
See Moran, supra note 15, at 655 (noting that Wisconsin has a relatively
small practicing bar); Eric Goldman, supra note 141 (arguing that the diploma
privilege encourages graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools to practice in
Wisconsin).
153
Lewis, supra note 130, at 649–50; see Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975) (“lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice”).
154
See Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 926
(7th Cir. 1994).
155
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
156
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
157
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
158
See Scariano, 38 F.3d at 926.
152
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1. The Diploma Privilege Lacks a Discriminatory Purpose or Effect
Underlying the virtual per se rule of invalidity test is the
assumption that the challenged regulation has a discriminatory purpose
or effect. 159 Of course, the notion of “discrimination” under the
dormant Commerce Clause rests on a comparison of in-state benefits
and burdens with out-of-state benefits and burdens. 160 The diploma
privilege neither facially nor effectually discriminates against
commerce because the purported burden and corresponding benefit
under the rule—requiring graduates of other ABA-accredited law
schools to sit for the Wisconsin bar examination while exempting
graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools from it—applies to both
residents and nonresidents alike. 161 As the Seventh Circuit recognized
in Wiesmueller, 162 nonresidents may attend one of the Wisconsin law
schools and receive admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the
diploma privilege. 163 Conversely, residents of Wisconsin who attend
an out-of-state law school and desire admission to the Wisconsin bar
must take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination. 164 In short, the
diploma privilege affords no preference to in-state interests over outof-state interests.
More significantly, the diploma privilege lacks any differential
treatment between similarly situated persons. 165 Prior to Wiesmueller,
no litigant has ever challenged the diploma privilege under the
Commerce Clause. Instead, litigants relied on the Equal Protection
Clause and argued that the diploma privilege created an arbitrary
distinction between eligible and ineligible recipients of the diploma
159

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981).
O’Grady, supra note 66, at 583.
161
See Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099, 1107–08
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that New Jersey’s bar admission rules were not subject to the
heightened level of dormant Commerce Clause review because the rules affected
both residents and nonresidents equally).
162
571 F.3d 699, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2009).
163
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
164
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04.
165
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).
160
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privilege by excusing only the former from the bar examination. 166
Like prior challenges to the diploma privilege, the plaintiffs in
Wiesmueller appeared to complain not about the burdens of having to
take the bar examination, but about a purported unfair advantage that
graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools had over graduates of
other ABA-accredited law schools. 167 Consistent with the plaintiffs’
contention, Judge Posner suggested that the diploma privilege created
an arbitrary distinction between graduates of the two Wisconsin law
schools and graduates of other ABA-accredited law schools. 168
Generally, this claim is most naturally assessed under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 169 Nonetheless,
similar to the Equal Protection doctrine, 170 any notion of
discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause assumes a
comparison of substantially similar entities. 171 This central assumption
has often remained ignored in the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court. 172 Under Wisconsin’s diploma privilege rule,
graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of other
ABA-accredited law schools are unequally situated.
166

See, e.g., Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 679 (N.D. Miss. 1974)
(three-judge panel); Huffman v. Mont. Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (D.
Mont. 1974) (three-judge panel), aff’d mem., 419 U.S. 955 (1974); Goetz v.
Harrison, 462 P.2d 891, 893 (Mont. 1969).
167
See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 10, Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d
699 (7th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2527).
168
Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2009).
169
See Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the
plaintiff’s real objection to the Illinois bar admission rule is “that it creates an
arbitrary distinction between experienced new residents and equally experienced
nonresidents by excusing the former from the bar exam required of the latter,” which
“is a claim most naturally assessed under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
170
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike)).
171
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).
172
Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 298–99.
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Underlying the arbitrary distinction theory advanced by Judge
Posner is the assumption that graduates of the two Wisconsin law
schools and graduates of other ABA-accredited law schools receive an
equal legal education. However, unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
which imposes the thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules on diploma
privilege applicants, 173 the American Bar Association does not dictate
curriculum requirements for purposes of accreditation. 174 Instead, the
American Bar Association merely requires substantial instruction in:
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession;
(2) legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem
solving, and oral communication; (3) writing in a legal
context, including at least one rigorous writing experience in
the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing
experience after the first year; (4) other professional skills
generally regarded as necessary for effective responsible
participation in the legal profession; and (5) the history,
goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal
profession and its members. 175
The differences in curriculum requirements renders graduates of the
two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of other ABA-accredited
law schools unequally situated for purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 176 Absent a comparison of similarly-situated objects, the
173

See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
See Stack, supra note 16, at 128.
175
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2009–2010 ABA STANDARDS FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20092010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3.pdf.
176
See Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 310 (rejecting the claim that the state’s
differential treatment between sales of gas by domestic utilities and sales of gas by
other entities violated the Commerce Clause because the enterprises were not
similarly situated); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686–87 (N.D. Miss.
1974) (three-judge panel) (holding that differences in curriculum requirements and
content at the University of Mississippi School of Law and other law schools
174
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heightened level of review under the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine does not apply. 177
While Wisconsin limits the diploma privilege to graduates of
Wisconsin’s two law schools, 178 an out-of-state law school could
conceivably comply with the requirements of the thirty-credit and
sixty-credit rules and incorporate Wisconsin law into its curriculum. 179
Under these circumstances, graduates of the out-of-state law school
and graduates of Wisconsin’s two law schools would appear similarly
situated. Still, Wisconsin could deny the out-of-state graduate
admission to the Wisconsin bar by virtue of the diploma privilege
without discriminating against interstate commerce. 180 Courts have
continuously upheld state licensing restrictions limiting admission to
the state bar to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools. 181 The basis
of these decisions rests on administrative efficiency. 182 Similarly, the
provided a rational basis to exempt only graduates of the former from the
Mississippi bar examination).
177
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
601 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Disparate treatment constitutes discrimination
only if the objects of the disparate treatment are, for the relevant purposes, similarly
situated.”).
178
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
179
See Stack, supra note 16, at 128 n.63.
180
See id.
181
See, e.g., Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding
that the Arizona bar admission rule restricting bar admission to graduates of an
accredited law school was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable); Nordgren v.
Hafter, 616 F. Supp. 742, 755 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that the unequal treatment
or classification between graduates of ABA-accredited law schools and graduates of
non-ABA-accredited law schools is justified under the rational basis test since it
serves the interest of the state in arriving at an objective measure of the quality of
legal training of its prospective lawyers).
182
Seeking uniform and measurable admission standards, the Florida Supreme
Court discussed the rationale underlying the ABA-accreditation requirement:
We were persuaded to follow the American Bar Association standards
relating to accreditation of law schools because we sought to provide an
objective method of determining the quality of the educational
environment of prospective attorneys. This was deemed especially
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Wisconsin Supreme Court cannot ensure that the curricula at other
ABA-accredited law schools meet the requirements of Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 40.03. 183 The inability of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to determine whether out-of-state law schools comply with the
thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules and incorporate Wisconsin law into
their curricula would provide a constitutionally sufficient basis for
limiting the diploma privilege to graduates of Wisconsin’s law
schools, 184 especially in light of Wisconsin’s compelling interest in
regulating its bar. 185
2. Under the Pike Balancing Test, Adverse Effects upon Wisconsin
Residents Mean a Permissible Burden on Commerce
Since the diploma privilege does not purposefully or effectually
discriminate against interstate commerce, the appropriate level of
review under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is the Pike
balancing test. 186 The Pike balancing test has become the proverbial
constitutional rule for nondiscriminatory analysis, despite criticism in
approach and uncertainty in application. 187 Both Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas describe the Pike balancing inquiry as a policy-laden,

necessary because of the rapid growth in the number of educational
institutions awarding law degrees. We wished to be certain that each of
these many law schools provided applicants with a quality legal
education, but we were unequipped to make such a determination
ourselves because of financial limitations and the press of judicial
business.
LaBossiere v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 279 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 1973).
183
See Rankin, supra note 141 (extending the diploma privilege to other law
schools “may sound easy on the surface, but operationally the process would be
terribly difficult”).
184
See Stack, supra note 16, at 128 n.63.
185
See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
186
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
187
David S. Day, Revisiting Pike: The Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier
of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 45, 60 (2004).
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legislative function, which the courts are ill-suited to perform. 188 In
essence, the ad hoc balancing approach requires courts to act as
“super-legislatures.” 189 The Supreme Court in Department of Revenue
of Kentucky v. Davis declined to apply the Pike inquiry altogether,
noting that the judiciary is institutionally unsuited to draw reliable
conclusions necessary for the Pike standard. 190 Likewise, some lower
courts echo a similar reluctance to apply the Pike balancing test. 191
Judge Posner in Wiesmueller noted that “[t]he judiciary lacks the time
and the knowledge to be able to strike a fine balance between the
burden that a particular state regulation lays on interstate commerce
and the benefit of that regulation to the state’s legitimate interests.” 192
Pike nonetheless identified three different components of the
nondiscrimination standard: (1) the burden imposed on interstate
commerce; (2) the putative local benefits; and (3) and available
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 193
The purported burden under the diploma privilege rule is the bar
examination. 194 Unlike diploma privilege recipients, graduates of nonWisconsin law schools who desire to practice law in Wisconsin must
188

United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 348–49 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
189
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425, 441–42 (1981).
190
128 S. Ct. 1801, 1818 (2008); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519
U.S. 278, 308–10 (1997) (recognizing that “the Court is institutionally unsuited to
gather facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally
untrained to make them”); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92
(1987) (declining to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning
the utility of the challenged legislation).
191
See, e.g., Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1994); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass’n. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994).
192
571 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 505 (7th Cir. 1989)).
193
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
194
See Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 68 (1988) (taking
judicial notice that the bar exam “is not a casual or lighthearted exercise”).
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take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination. 195 In addition to
preparing for the bar examination, 196 bar exam applicants incur greater
costs, especially for those who prudently enroll in a bar review
course. 197 But, does the Wisconsin bar examination actually restrict
the mobility of lawyers? 198 Put differently, does the diploma privilege
influence an aspiring lawyer’s decision where to attend law school? 199
The Seventh Circuit previously answered these questions in the
negative. 200 Whether prospective lawyers would attend one of the two
Wisconsin law schools simply because of the diploma privilege is pure
speculation. 201 Likewise, whether the requirement of taking and
passing the Wisconsin bar examination would actually exclude many
out-of-state graduates having a serious desire to practice in Wisconsin
is a matter of conjecture. 202

195

See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.04.
See Riebe, supra note 147, at 307 (noting that “[m]ost students study six
days a week, eight to ten hours a day, for at least ten weeks—a total of
approximately six hundred hours”).
197
See Association of American Law Schools, Society of American Law
Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 448 (2002) (noting
that bar review courses may cost as much as $3,000).
198
See Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[a]s we cannot say
that [the Illinois bar admission rule] is more likely to impede than to increase the
interstate mobility of lawyers, it is apparent that Illinois has not violated the
commerce clause”).
199
See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[i]t is
enough that an aspiring lawyer’s decision about where to study, and therefore about
where to live as a student, can be influenced by the diploma privilege to bring this
case within at least the outer bounds of the commerce clause”). In essence, the
burden in Wiesmueller was the adverse constraint on a law applicant’s decisionmaking, not simply the increased costs and delays of the bar examination. See id.
200
See Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920, 927
(7th Cir. 1994).
201
See id.
202
See id.; Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 47 F.3d 173,
174 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting
that the burden imposed by the bar examination is small).
196
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The second component of the Pike balancing test is the putative
local benefits of the diploma privilege. 203 As discussed, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court presumably designed the diploma privilege rule to
ensure competency in the practice of law, including familiarity in
Wisconsin law. 204 The Seventh Circuit has identified these interests as
legitimate. 205 Despite the deference generally afforded to states in
regulating their bars, 206 Judge Posner effectively placed the burden on
Wisconsin to substantiate the putative local benefits, noting that “there
may be nothing at all to justify [the diploma privilege].” 207 Only when
the burdens of a particular bar admission rule fall predominantly on
out-of-state interests should the court place the burden of persuasion
on the state. 208
203

397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
See supra Part III.A.
205
See Scariano, 38 F.3d at 924.
206
See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam); Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2005) (when
assessing whether a statute has “a legitimate local purpose” and “putative local
benefits” under Pike, a court must proceed with deference to the state legislature).
207
Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2009).
208
Compare Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–73
(1981) (implying that the state legislature considered the national interest in the free
flow of commerce in determining the appropriate extent of the statutory restrictions
at issue since the restrictions directly affected some in-state retailers and producers),
and S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938)
(upholding state restrictions on trucks since “[t]he fact that they affect alike shippers
in interstate and intrastate commerce in large number within as well as without the
state is a safeguard against their abuse”), with Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm’ n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (requiring the state to justify the regulation at
issue both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local
interests at stake since the regulation had the effect of burdening out-of-state
interests while leaving in-state interests unaffected), and Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 446–47 (1978) (finding state regulation governing the
length and configuration of trucks unconstitutional under the dormant commerce
clause in part because the regulatory scheme provided for a number of exceptions,
primarily for the benefit of in-state interests, and thus undermined the assumption
that the State’s own political process will act as a check on local regulations that
unduly burden interstate commerce).
204
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The United States Supreme Court often justifies judicial review
under the dormant Commerce Clause, even in the absence of textual
support, 209 on grounds that it compensates for a defect in the political
process. 210 Under the inner political process theory, when a legislative
body enacts legislation with corresponding burdens falling solely or
predominantly on a group represented in the legislature, a presumption
arises that the enactment is rationally based, efficacious, and no more
burdensome than is necessary to achieve its proffered purpose. 211
However, when a legislative body enacts legislation with
corresponding burdens falling predominantly on nonresidents
unrepresented in the legislative body, the presumption of validity
ceases to exist and the need for judicial intervention is greater to
protect unrepresented interests from protectionist statutes.212
The political process theory not only solidifies the putative local
benefits of the diploma privilege, but also guarantees a procedure no
more burdensome than is necessary to achieve them. As discussed, the
diploma privilege affords no preference to in-state residents over outof-state residents. 213 Thus, represented and unrepresented interests
equally share any burden under the diploma privilege rule. 214
Represented interests—those who graduate from non-Wisconsin law
schools and desire to practice law in Wisconsin—serve as a check
209

Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 617 (1987) (“[t]he
dormant commerce clause lacks a foundation or justification in either the
Constitution’s text or history”).
210
Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L.
REV. 125, 164–65 (1979).
211
Eule, supra note 189, at 445; see Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at
473 n.17 (“[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely affected by the
[legislation] is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse”).
212
Eule, supra note 189, at 445; see S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303 U.S. at 185
n.2 (“when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon
those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects
adversely some interests within the state”).
213
See supra Part III.B.1.
214
See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03.
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against protectionist impulses and assure that Wisconsin sufficiently
realizes the benefits of the diploma privilege rule, namely, competent
attorneys in both national and local law. 215 Though not a legislative
enactment, the political process theory also applies to the diploma
privilege. Enactors of the diploma privilege—members of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court—are elected officials; consequently, they
are responsive to Wisconsin residents. 216 In short, adversely affected
in-state interests under the diploma privilege rule avoids a distortion in
the political process, and judicial intervention on grounds of an
unreasonable burden is unnecessary. 217
The final component of the Pike test is a “means” prong
analysis. 218 This analysis requires courts to consider whether the stated
legitimate purpose could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate commerce. 219 When assessing the constitutionality of a
statute, some courts have searched for nondiscriminatory
alternatives. 220 In the context of bar admission rules, however, courts
have been reluctant to invoke a “means” analysis in light of state
interest in regulating admission standards. 221 Significantly, courts
cannot readily identify an alternative less restrictive than the bar
examination. 222 Wisconsin could, for example, require all applicants
seeking admission to the Wisconsin bar to take a continuing legal
education course in Wisconsin law in lieu of a bar examination. 223 But
215

See Eule, supra note 189, at 445–46.
See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4; Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir.
1985) (recognizing that the bar admission rule burdened residents and nonresidents
equally, which provided some assurance that the burden was a moderate and
reasonable, rather than arbitrary and prohibitive, burden)
217
See Tushnet, supra note 210, at 140.
218
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
219
Id.
220
See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’ n, 432 U.S. 333, 355
(1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354–55 (1951).
221
See Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Va., 766 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir. 1985).
222
Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 1985).
223
Judge Posner raised this alternative in Wiesmueller. See 571 F.3d 699, 702–
03 (7th Cir. 2009).
216
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as the Seventh Circuit recognized in Sestric v. Clark, this alternative
could easily be more burdensome and exclusionary than the bar
examination. 224 Constant judicial intervention would be necessary not
only to weigh the relative impact of all available nondiscriminatory
alternatives of the diploma privilege, 225 but also to ensure that they
were less restrictive. 226 The fact that Wisconsin remains the only state
to honor the diploma privilege does not render its admission procedure
unconstitutional. 227 Wisconsin is free to exercise its own judgment and
is not bound by the decisions of other states. 228
CONCLUSION
In Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, the Seventh Circuit suggested that
the diploma privilege restricted the mobility of lawyers in violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause. 229 In guaranteeing that only competent
lawyers practice within its borders, Wisconsin could require all
lawyers to take and pass the Wisconsin bar examination. Wisconsin
elected to provide the diploma privilege in lieu of the bar examination
for those lawyers—residents and non-residents alike—who satisfy the
thirty-credit and sixty-credit rules. This approach may not gain any
support from economists. But, a bar admission rule “can be both
economic folly and constitutional.” 230

224

See 765 F.2d at 663; see also Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We
Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and
Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 449 (2001) (noting that continuing legal
education programs hardly guarantee any level of competence).
225
See Goldfarb, 766 F.2d at 863.
226
See Sestric, 765 F.2d at 664.
227
See S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 195–96
(1938).
228
See id.
229
571 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2009).
230
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96–97 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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